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Abstract—Location privacy is an oft-overlooked, but exceedingly important niche of the overall privacy macrocosm. An
ambition of this work is to raise awareness of concerns relating
to location privacy in cellular networks. To this end, we will
demonstrate how user location information is leaked through
a vulnerability, viz. the timing advance (TA) parameter, in
the Long Term Evolution (LTE) signaling plane and how
the position estimate that results from that parameter can
be refined through a previously introduced method called
Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement (CeSAR) [1].
With CeSAR, positioning accuracies that meet or exceed the
FCC’s E-911 mandate are possible making CeSAR simultaneously a candidate technology for meeting the FCC’s wireless
localization requirements and a demonstration of the alarming
level of location information sent over the air. We also introduce
a geographically diverse data set of TAs collected from actual
LTE network implementations utilizing different cell phone
chipsets. With this data set we show the appropriateness
of modeling the error associated with a TA as normally
distributed.

1. Introduction
With the numbers of Long Term Evolution (LTE) subcribers projected to increase from 1.1 billion in 2015 to
4.3 billion over the next five years [2], this leading cellular
technology has never been so nascent a worldwide social
force. Additionally, not only are the number of LTE connections increasing, but the frequency in which the individual
uses the cellular link is also increasing. Currently, in North
America, each subscriber uses about 3.7 gigabytes a month.
Over the next five years that number is expected to increase
to 22 gigabytes a month [2]. Further, LTE-Advanced (a
series of proposed enhancements to LTE such as carrier
aggregation, small cells, and MIMO [3]) connections are
projected to grow to 500 million by 2018 making the once
lofty 3Gb/s wireless links a global reality. LTE is poised to
deliver unprecedented improvements in quality of life and
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worldwide productivity. However, as we move towards these
principled ends, we must take care with how we integrate
this technology into our social fabric.
Protecting the cellular user’s privacy is of special importance. The LTE standard has made great strides in protecting
the confidentiality of the user’s data plane over older technologies, such as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS), through means such as mutual authentication between the user equipment (UE) and the cellular
infrastructure [4]. However, other architectural shifts have
left less obvious parts of the radio link, such as the signaling
plane, vulnerable to location privacy attacks [1].
Location privacy has received a significant amount of
attention in the literature over the last several years [5]–
[10]. The seminal definition of location privacy is given by
Westin as
. . . the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others [11].
This definition subsumes many modern ideas associated with the use of location information. For instance,
anonymized datasets are sometimes recorded in third party
servers for the purpose of sociological and market studies,
optimal cell tower placement, or traffic monitoring [6]. However, it has been well-known in the scientific community that
anonymous location data can be attributed back to specific
individuals with remarkable accuracy through computational
means such as Markov modeling [6].
More alarming than the knowledge of this possibility
is the public’s apparent indifference or ignorance to threats
to their location privacy. One study reported that 250 users
willingly surrendered two weeks of their driving GPS data
in return for a 1 in 100 chance of winning a US $200 MP3
player. Moreover, of those 250 individuals, 97 were asked
if their data could be shared with third parties and only
20% declined [8]. This general sentiment is indicative of
public attitudes toward location privacy and can be found in
numerous other studies [12]–[14].
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Figure 1: The TA is part of a MAC layer (which encapsulates
the radio link control layer protocol data unit) control element [15]. During maintenance the TA is a six bit quantity.
LTE release 11+ includes a TA group (TAG) field in order
to support multiple TAs from multiple eNBs.
A leading ambition of this work is to raise awareness of
concerns relating to location privacy in cellular networks.
To this end, we intend to demonstrate how user location
information is leaked through a vulnerability, viz. the timing
advance (TA) parameter, in the LTE signaling plane and how
the position estimate that results from that parameter can
be refined through a previously introduced method called
Cellular Synchronization Assisted Refinement (CeSAR) [1].
Our findings are validated through localization case studies
conducted in real-world LTE network deployments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 some preliminaries and theory regarding the use of
TA in UE positioning are discussed. In Section 3 we profile
the TA behavior in the wild. Section 4 discusses the attack
framework, experimental setup, and presents the results of
the experiments. Finally, related work and conclusions are
presented in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.

2. The LTE Signaling Plane
In this section we illuminate the portion of the signaling
plane we will exploit. A full review of the signaling plane is
beyond the scope of this paper; however, we refer the interested reader to [4] and [15] for a more in-depth treatment.
Our discussion will highlight the TA and how it can be used
to provide a UE location, with and without CeSAR. Finally,
we discuss the architectural security shift in LTE that makes
these attacks possible.

2.1. Frame Timing Management in LTE
LTE manages medium multiple access through orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA). OFDMA
requires that uplink frames arrive at the cell tower, or
enhanced-node B (eNB), at the time in which a particular
user is scheduled. Any deviation from the scheduled frame
arrival time can result in inter-symbol interference which
significantly degrades the wireless link. Because user mobility is a inseparable attribute of cellular networks, it is
clear that the propagation delay between the UE and the

Figure 2: The CeSAR method [1] is a completely passive enhancement to TA-based positioning which can be performed
with a simple software defined radio implementation.
eNB will not be constant. Therefore, in order to incorporate
propagation delay into scheduling, and thus prevent intersymbol interference, a TA parameter is included as a control
element (CE) in the medium access control (MAC) layer (cf.
Figure 1). This network controlled parameter modifies the
UE’s uplink burst timing such that it takes into account and
adjusts for the propagation delay [15].
During normal maintenance of the wireless link, the TA
is a six-bit quantity where each bit represents 16×Ts seconds
and Ts is the sampling period computed as
Ts = (∆f × 2048)−1 .

(1)

Here ∆f is the subcarrier spacing (nominally 15kHz) and
2048 is the maximum Fast Fourier Transform size [16], [17].

2.2. CeSAR
CeSAR is a previously introduced and completely passive enhancement to TA-based positioning that has been
shown in simulation to improve position estimates by up
to 250 meters [1]. The method requires a sensor in the
same cell as the UE. The sensor need not be complex, for
instance, it could be implemented with a simple processor
and a software defined radio. The method also requires a
priori knowledge of the location of the serving eNB(s) and
the sensor. The general steps for the method are outlined
here for completeness and are shown graphically in Figure 2.
Further implementation details can be found in [1].
1) Monitor UE uplink allocation.
2) Observe TA sent from the eNB(s) to the UE (this step
is interchangeable with step 3).
3) Observe UE uplink burst (this step is interchangeable
with step 2).
4) Calculate UE-sensor distance.
5) Estimate UE position.
The contribution of CeSAR is essentially an additional
equation added to the total system of equations described by
the TA annulus(i) which describes the UE-sensor distance.

2.3. Localization Attacks with Timing Advance and
CeSAR
Once the TA is known the eNB-UE distance, dˆ, can be
estimated via
16c
)
(2)
dˆ = TA × Ts (
2
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where c is the speed of light and TA ∈ [0, . . . , 63] is the binary TA value found in the MAC CE [1]. A straightforward
result of (2) is that each TA increment represents 78.125
meters of distance.
The quality of the resulting estimate is a function of the
following conditions.
1)
2)
3)
4)

The
The
The
The

frequency of TA issuance.
number of connected eNBs.
eNB(s)-sensor-UE geometry.
channel quality.

The frequency of TA issuance is lower bounded by the
timeAlignmentTimer [18]. This is a configurable, implementation specific, parameter which ranges from 500ms
to 10s. We have found that the timeAlignmentTimer
value differs by network provider, but that in practice TAs
can be issued much more frequently than specified by the
timeAlignmentTimer and can be part of the MAC
header for nearly every packet sent to the UE from the
serving eNB. Further, an active connection is not needed
in order to be issued a TA. In practice, TAs are issued
periodically even when the UE is in RRC IDLE mode. It
is straightforward that more frequent TAs provide a better
position estimate. Frequent TAs will allow position estimation to recover from outliers more quickly and provide more
granularity when tracking.
If the distribution of error, p(∣TA ), is known then the
expected positioning performance can be described via the
Cramer-Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) [19], given by
√
var(p̂) ≥

trace(I−1 )

where p̂ = [x̂, ŷ ] is the position estimate and I is the Fisher
information matrix (FIM). If p(∣TA ) is approximated as
normal (≈ N (0, σ )) then it can be shown that
(x−xi )(y −yi )
σi2 d2i
2
N (y −yi )
∑i=1 σ2 d2
i i

N

∑i=1

The channel conditions play a significant role in the
accuracy of TA. A common channel model for positioning
applications is
d̂ = d + λ + η
(5)
where d̂ is the set of observed transmitter(Tx)-receiver(Rx)
distances, d are the true distances, λ is a random vector
representing the non-line of sight (NLoS) error associated
with the signal traveling a non-minimal distance between the
Tx-Rx, and η is a normally distributed measurement error.
If N > 2 the presence of λ and η guarantee that the system
of equations will be strictly inconsistent. If N ≤ 2 then the
system may not have a unique solution (and may also still be
inconsistent). Achieving an optimal solution with equations
of this type is a well-studied field in the literature [19].
This paper only considers scenarios where N ≥ 2 so we
choose the residual error method [20] of selecting a position
estimate
N
2
p̂ = min {∑ (dˆi − ∥ p − xi ∥) } .
(6)
p

i=1

T

Here xi = [xi , yi ] is the location of the ith eNB (or CeSAR
sensor), and ∥ ⋅ ∥ is the Euclidean norm. The residual
weighting method is well-known and accepted technique for
finding a parameter when its error distribution is not well
characterized [19].

2.5. Timing Advance as a Location Privacy Preserving Mechanism

(3)

T

⎡
(x−xi )2
⎢ ∑N
i=1 σ 2 d 2
⎢
I = ⎢ N (x−xii)(yi −yi )
⎢ ∑
⎢ i=1
σi2 d2i
⎣

2.4. Resolution of Inconsistent Equations

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥.
⎥
⎥
⎦

(4)

A result of (3) and (4) is that as the CRLB varies inversely
with the number of eNBs, N . Further, channel conditions
can be represented in (4) with σ and geometry is represented
in the numerators of the elements of the FIM.
In summary, the best possible environment for positioning would be one in which the UE is connected to multiple
eNBs (N >> 1), the connected eNBs are not collinear to the
UE (more specifically that the UE is within the convex hull
of the eNBs), the UE is close to and has a line of sight to
the connected eNBs (thus improving channel conditions),
and TA issuance is sufficiently frequent. In line with the
first observation about relationship between N and p̂, since
NCeSAR = NT A + 1 it can be seen from (3) that CeSAR will,
in general, improve positioning performance. The expected
magnitude of improvement is explored for various scenarios
with various N in [1].

A LPPM is a method for separating a user, ui , from that
user’s location, l, and has two components: obfuscation and
anonymization [10]. The act of obfuscating a location will
add noise to the actual location, d′ = f1 (p), thus an attacker
using obfuscated only data, ⟨ui , d′ ⟩, will have access to user
identities, but the associated location data will be imperfect.
The act of anonymizing data will replace the user identity
with a pseudonym, u′ = f2 (ui ), thus an attacker using
anonymized only data will have access to exact locations
but not identities. A obfuscated and anonymized data set,
⟨u′ , d′ ⟩, will provide an attacker access to neither piece of
information directly.
Formally, the TA can be modeled as a LPPM. The noise
added to the data can be modeled with the function
d =∥ p − x ∥ + UT A

(7)

where UT A denotes a uniform random variable ∈
(0, 78.125). In other words, The TA obfuscates the actual
UE position through a process of spatial quantization. Next,
the network anonymizes the UE through assignment of a
cell-radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) [15]. The
C-RNTI is a 16-bit value that uniquely identifies a UE when
connected to a specific eNB. The C-RNTI can be thought of
as a software address and is assigned dynamically. Therefore, the C-RNTI mapping, fC −RN T I (⋅), can be thought of
as LPPM anonymization.

6287

60
40

50

8000

40

6000

1500
1000

30
4000
20

20
0
-200

-100

0

100

0
-200

200

500

2000

10
-100

0

100

0
-200

200

-100

0

100

0
-200

200

-100

0

100

200

Positioning Error (m)

Positioning Error (m)

Positioning Error (m)

(a) TA error distribution of set 1.

(b) TA error distribution of set 2.

(c) TA error distribution of set 3.

(d) TA error distribution of set 4.

0
-100
-200

-2

0

2

Standard Normal Quantiles

(e) TA QQ plot of set 1.

100
0
-100
-200

-2

0

2

Standard Normal Quantiles

(f) TA QQ plot of set 2.

200

Quantiles of TA Error

100

200

Quantiles of TA Error

200

Quantiles of TA Error

Quantiles of TA Error

Positioning Error (m)

100
0
-100
-200

-2

0

2

Standard Normal Quantiles

(g) TA QQ plot of set 3.

200
100
0
-100
-200

-2

0

2

Standard Normal Quantiles

(h) TA QQ plot of set 4.

Figure 3: The error associated with the TA is presented here along with a QQ plot as a graphical comparison against normally
distributed data. All data was collected in suburban environments where a line of sight component is assumed. Tracks 1 and
2 were taken in Monterey, California with the Snapdragon 805 chipset. Tracks 3 and 4 were taken in Annapolis, Maryland
with the Snapdragon 801 chipset. All data was collected on the same mobile network carrier.
This LPPM is weak for several reasons. First, the quality
of the obfuscation declines rapidly when multiple eNBs
are configured. This study will focus primarily on driving
this point home. Additionally, cell sectors would also serve
to de-obfuscate l′ . The quality of anonymity provided by
fC −RN T I (⋅) is also in question [4], [21] although this work
will not focus on exploiting this portion of the TA LPPM.

2.6. Confidentiality of the Timing Advance
The TA is a particularly vulnerable parameter since
it is sent in clear text on the air interface in LTE. This
marks a significant shift in security architecture from earlier
technologies like the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) where the TA would not have as readily been
available. In LTE, the Packet Data Convergence Protocol
(PDCP), a layer 2 sublayer, is responsible for ciphering
(encryption). Therefore nothing in the lower layers (e.g.,
the Radio Link Control and MAC layers) is ciphered [22].
Because the MAC CE is the primary bearer of the TA (cf.
Figure 1), the TA is sent unencrypted.

2.7. Confidentiality of Uplink Grants
In order for CeSAR to be effective, the sensor must be
able to determine what resource elements a UE has been
assigned to for uplink (cf. Figure 2). In LTE this information,
similar to the TA, is unprotected over the air interface.
LTE has a relatively flat logical channel architecture. The
channels are broken into the downlink and uplink subgroups
of which the former is of particular interest. In this group
there exists a Downlink Control Channel (DCCH) which is
a bearer of mainly the Radio Resource Control (RRC) layer
information. Also, LTE specifies certain physical channels

onto which no logical channel will map. Of interest to this
work is the Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH)
and the Physical Uplink Control Channel (PUCCH).
Scheduling is the responsibility of the MAC layer and
is done dynamically on a frame-by-frame (i.e., 1ms) basis1 [15]. Therefore, LTE does not assign dedicated control channels. Instead, the information pertaining to uplink
scheduling is found in the PDCCH broadcast in the L1/L2
control region of each downlink frame [15].
Consider a UE with information to transmit to the network and without a current valid scheduling grant. The UE
will first utilize the uplink L1/L2 control region to indicate
to the eNB that it requires uplink resources. As previously
discussed, the eNB’s scheduling decisions are issued via the
PDCCH in the L1/L2 control region. Each scheduling grant
is appended with a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) which
is calculated with the intended recipient’s (or recipients’
in the case of multicast) radio network temporary identifier (RNTI). Therefore all grants sent via the PDCCH are
checked by each UE with their allocated RNTIs. Grants that
do not check out are discarded as either not intended for the
UE or invalid [15]. The PDCCH is continuously monitored
by each connected UE to update its uplink grant allocation as
it is changed dynamically. Therefore, since this information
sits below the PDCP it will not be encrypted.

3. Timing Advance Behavior in Modern LTE
Networks
In this section we present TA data from three real world
LTE cellular network deployments. The first deployment is
1
It should be noted that the the network can also optionally choose to
implement semi-persistent, vice dynamic scheduling.
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Figure 4: Track 1, used for evaluation of TA-based positioning and CeSAR, is presented in this figure. The track
is 830 meters long and includes 323 recorded TA values.
Connections were made in this track over the 700 MHz,
1900 MHz, and 2110 MHz bands. Surrounding areas and the
exact track location are not presented in order to maintain
experimental anonymity.

Figure 5: Track 2, used for evaluation of TA-based positioning and CeSAR, is presented in this figure. The track
is 277 meters long and includes 73 recorded TA values.
Connections were made in this track over the 700 MHz and
2110 MHz bands. Surrounding areas and the exact track
location are not presented in order to maintain experimental
anonymity.

in Monterey, California and is displayed in Figures 3(a) and
3(b) (set 1 and set 2). These sets represent 197 and 237
TAs respectively and were captured using the Qualcomm
Snapdragon 805 chipset. Sets 1 and 2 both utilized the
700 MHz band. Set 3 is shown in Figure 3(c). These data
were collected in Annapolis, Maryland and are comprised
of 27,200 TAs. Set 4 is shown in Figure 3(d). These data
were collected in San Diego, California and are comprised
of 5,500 TAs. Sets 3 and 4 were taken with the Qualcomm
Snapdragon 801 chipset and utilized the 1900 MHz band.2
All the data was collected in suburban settings free from
major physical obstructions between the eNB and UE. In
tracks 1 and 2 only one building exceeded the typical height
of two stories. That structure was six stories tall. Further,
track 2 was markedly more rural, however significant variations in terrain height and dense coniferous foliage were
noted. Tracks 3 and 4 are similar in layout to track 1.
The most obvious observation is that the error distribution is not uniform as is commonly assumed in TA-based
simulations. Rather, the distribution follows some density
that is not, strictly speaking, well defined, but is peaked,
and unimodal. A comparison of the error distribution with
normally distributed data is shown in the QQ plots in
Figure 3. Upon inspection, a reasonable fit of the data to
the standard normal quantiles is apparent.
To further qualify the goodness of fit to the normal
distribution, Pearson’s chi-squared test was used. In each of
the sets a subset of 50 samples were randomly selected and
the p-value was computed with the null hypothesis that the
data were drawn from the standard normal distribution. This

method was used in order to avoid over sensitivities in the
test with large data sets and to provide a standard metric
with which to compare the data from sets of a different
size. After repeating the above process 10,000 times, sets
1-4 had an average p-value of 0.4097, 0.4227, 0.1587, and
0.1307 respectively. This suggests that the null hypothesis
should not be rejected. It may therefore be appropriate to
approximate the error in suburban TA data as normal. This
is especially true when performing a localization attack in
which a large number of data are not considered as a whole
but rather the working set is limited to a small amount of
data at a specific instance in time.

2
Occasionally, extreme outliers in TA data are noticed. They are not
shown in Figure 3 for clarity of presentation.

4. Experimental Validation
In this section we first formalize the attack framework [10]. Next, we describe the experimental setup and
the results that follow.

4.1. Attack Framework
Location privacy attacks can be broadly classified into
three types of attacks: a meeting disclosure attack, a tracking
attack, or a localization attack [10]. In a meeting disclosure
attack the adversary is not concerned with the position of
the victim in a geodetic sense. Rather, this is a more subtle
attack in which the adversary is concerned with learning
the nature of the interactions of the victim with other users
(e.g., to learn a victim’s social network). In a tracking attack
the adversary seeks to understand a position history of the
victim. Conversely, a localization attack is only concerned
with gleaning the current location of the victim. This work
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Figure 6: The positioning performance obtained using the
track 1 data. TA only positioning is compared to the positioning possible when the TA is augmented with CeSAR.

Figure 7: The positioning performance obtained using the
track 2 data. TA only positioning is compared to the positioning possible when the TA is augmented with CeSAR.

is primarily concerned with the latter category of attack
although the principles of the illustrated vulnerability are
applicable to the entire spectrum of attacks.
We assume here that the adversary has real-time access
to the information ⟨u, d′ ⟩ where u is the set of attributable
user identities and d′ = f (p), where f (⋅) is modeled as in
(7). Therefore perfect knowledge of the identity to C-RNTI
mapping is assumed.

in suburban settings free from major physical obstructions
between the eNB and UE at approximately 50 kilometers
per hour. Position estimates were made a posteriori in postprocessing.
The CeSAR method was bootstraped into the experiment
in post-processing with a notional sensor located as in Figures 4 and 5 to provide reasonable geometry for trilateration.
The estimated error in distance resolution from the CeSAR
sensor to the UE was modeled as N (0, 20) where units are
given in meters.
As previously discussed in Section 2.4, a position estimate is extracted from the resulting system of equations via
the minimization of residual error method [20], given in (6),
for both TA only and CeSAR augmented positioning.

4.2. Experimental Setup
In order to quantify the expected positioning performance using the TA parameter and also compare the performance increase possible through CeSAR, we conducted
two experiments where a target UE was connected to real
network infrastructure in Monterey, California. In each case
the UE was driven on a specified track while connected to
one neighboring eNB and the TAs issued from that tower
were recorded. The UE was then driven a second time
through the same track connected to a different neighboring
eNB and again the issued TAs were recorded (in the case
of track 1 this process was repeated once to increase the
data set size). This setup is designed to mimic heterogenous
network deployments expected in LTE release 11+ where
simultaneous timing management among multiple eNBs
will be necessary, thus TAs from multiple eNBs will be
available. The setup also mimicks previous suggestions in
the literature that TA-based positioning could be improved
through forcing an eNB handover [23].
Track 1 and track 2 are shown in Figures 4 and 5
respectively. The surrounding area is not presented in order
to preserve experimental anonymity. Track 1 is 277 meters
long and includes 73 recorded TA values in the 700 MHz
and 2110 MHz bands. Track 2 is 830 meters long and
includes 323 recorded TA values with links over the 700
MHz, 1900 MHz, and 2110 MHz bands. Both are conducted

4.3. Results
Positioning performance with the TA only method was
then evaluated by using the TAs issued from the two different towers to the UE located at a particular location.
This process was repeated for each TA pair in the track.
Ambiguity resolution in the resulting underdetermined set
of equations was assumed in order to provide a more robust
benchmark for validating CeSAR.
As expected, TA-based positioning in LTE is more precise than the performance previously theorized in GSM [23],
[24]. Using only two TAs an accuracy of 240 meters and
295 meters was found in tracks 1 and 2 respectively in the
sense of circular error probable (CEP) 70% 3 .
When augmented with CeSAR, TA-based positioning
improves to 95 meters and 157 meters in tracks 1 and
2 respectively. This suggests that CeSAR may be able to
3
CEP 70% is the error upper bounding the realized error 70% of the
time. In other words, CEP 70% is X when Pr{ ≤ X } = 0.7 and  is a
realization of the random variable in question.
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provide accuracies on the order of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) E-911 mandate for network based
techniques4 . In both cases positioning improvement on the
order of 150 meters is realized through CeSAR.

5. Related Work
In October of 1994 the United States FCC released a
notice of proposed rulemaking [24] requiring cell network
providers to locate users who dialed 911 (E-911). Ever since
that time there has been significant activity in the field of geolocation in cellular networks. To this end, many techniques
were proposed and studied. For example, the IEEE 802.11
standard continues to be a popular enabling technology due
to the ubiquity of Wi-Fi. Wi-Fi fingerprinting has been successfully used in indoor positioning, frequently exhibiting
room level [26] and even sub-meter accuracy [27].
While the fingerprinting method is popular in indoor
and urban environments, the TA has a long and storied
application in the literature for outdoor application. In [23],
the authors discuss the possibility of using TA as a mechanism for positioning. They note poor accuracy, and suggest
forcing base station handover in order to get a second TA
to improve positioning. They conclude that the accuracy is
not sufficient for TA to be seriously considered by itself as
a method for positioning.
Accuracy concerns are echoed in [24] where it is estimated that the accuracy of the GSM TA is theoretically
550 meters and practically 2,200 meters. Nevertheless, it
is noted that cell tower location in conjunction with TA
is used in many countries around the world as a means
for subscriber localization. This is also a ”fallback” GSM
localization technique in the United States if a subscriber
cannot be located with other, more accurate, means.
The authors in [28] suggested taking multiple TA measurements from the same tower and averaging them in order
to improve distance estimation. An analysis of the method is
presented, but no real-world experimentation was conducted.
It was noted that their method will only result in a distance
from the cell tower and any further improvement in accuracy
will result from other means.
In [29], the authors propose the use of GSM TA for
traffic state estimation, not for precise user localization.
However, their evaluation oversimplifies the TA behavior
in simulation. Again no real-world data is used.
The authors in [30] represent the only study we are
aware of that uses actual field recorded TA from a GSM
network, although their application was in finding GSM base
stations and not user location. Their study was still largely
simulation based and they only presented one real-world
example.
The largely unsuccessful first forays into using the TA as
a parameter for localization are probably to blame for the
limited amount of research in GSM TA positioning since
initial simulations were not promising. With an accuracy as
low as 550 meters to 2.2 kilometers it is not unsurprising
4

Pr( ≤ 100m) = 0.67 and Pr( ≤ 300m) = 0.95 [24], [25]

that the TA was largely abandoned by the community for a
time.
It was not until Jarvis et al. [16] recognized the potential
in the TA parameter in LTE networks that researchers reopened their study of the TA as a means to positioning.
Although again a simulation only approach, the authors
showed viable positioning accuracy in three dimensions
when using a TA from three and four eNBs. The authors did
not address how using more than one eNB would be possible
nor did they assume there was any error associated with the
eNB issuing the correct TA to the UE. Similar investigations
were conducted using WiMAX technology in [31].
In [32], Wigren uses the LTE TA as a complimentary
database feature when performing localization via fingerprinting, a method of comparing a priori measurements
with real time measurements to improve accuracy. Using
a heuristic approach to modeling the behavior of the TA,
he noted accuracies on the order of his TA error and suggested his algorithm as an appropriate fallback technology
for positioning for E-911 in LTE if Assisted-GPS was not
available.
The authors in [33] used LTE TA as a means for proximity discovery in device to device (D2D) communications.
They showed through simulation that errors as low as 50
meters were possible for certain eNB geometries. However,
their modeling of the TA was also heuristic, and did not
account for any error in the eNB issuing an incorrect TA.
The work represented by [34] is the only published work
we are aware of that uses actual field measurements to
validate TA-based approaches in LTE to positioning. Their
approach did not, however, focus on characterizing the TA.
Rather, similar to Wigren’s approach, they used it as another
feature in a fingerprinting approach to localization with
the aim of minimizing the cost of training their fingerprint
database. They also made no attempt to characterize how
the TA value correlated with the true distance of the UE.
In summary the corpus representing the TA parameter
in the literature is conspicuously sparse. Even more absent
are studies conducted with real-world data thus, making
modeling in simulation largely a product of conjecture. We
believe this is the first study done with real-world data
characterizing the behavior of the TA value. The work here
will allow future studies to accurately model TA error and
thus explore true maximum likelihood algorithms. We are
also the first to formalize this method as a localization attack
and apply real-world TA data to to show its efficacy.

6. Conclusions
In this study we have examined the signaling plane of the
LTE/LTE-A protocols in the context of a location privacy
attack. Specifically, the TA was used as a means to this
end. We propose that more should be done to protect the
individual user’s location privacy as the current protocol implementation almost continually broadcasts a user’s location
information in the clear.
In developing this argument we first presented the TA
as a LPPM in a formal attack framework. Specifically, we
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showed how the TA can be modeled as a obfuscation mechanism and the C-RNTI can be modeled as an anonymizing
mechanism. The scope of this work specifically at the TA as
an LPPM obfuscation mechanism, and user attribution was
assumed.
Next, we presented a geographically diverse data set
that also spanned several uplink frequencies and hardware.
We showed through graphical and quantitative means of
statistical inference that it may be appropriate to model the
TA error as Gaussian. This is significant as the literature has
traditionally treated this error as uniformly distributed. To
the best of our knowledge this is the first time this type of
data has been introduced into the literature.
Finally, we showed the type of accuracy possible from
TA-based positioning inside an actual network implementation. We further showed how, when augmented with CeSAR,
positioning accuracy can approach levels required by the
FCC’s E-911 mandate. In general, we showed CeSAR added
approximately 150 meters of accuracy (CEP 70%).
In summary, we demonstrated that an accurate localization attack can be performed on the LTE protocol due to
vulnerabilities in the signaling plane. Further, as the protocol
moves toward an implementation with denser infrastructure
(e.g., heterogeneous networks) this vulnerability becomes
even more exploitable. This complication could be remedied
by moving the TA into the portion of the ciphered text
similar to the GSM implementation.
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